The explosion in the literature on global constitutionalism in recent times has come at the cost of ever more, and more diverse, definitions of the concept of constitutionalism. 
Wiener et al (n 2) 8. 6 Ibid. 7 See above (n 4). 6 even accepting the transformations entailed in a 'post-Westphalian' 25 world, no site of suprastate governance could be legitimated to the same extent as the state or credibly take its place as a political actor (improbability); and relatedly, any attempt to legitimize suprastate governance in constitutional terms is therefore necessarily illegitimate.
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The existence of the cacophony fuels these forms of suprastate constitutionalism in that the question of impossibility is refl ected in the fact that the myriad of conceptions of constitutionalism advanced in global constitutionalism testify to the fact that the unique problems of legitimacy in the state and in particular the centralization of power are not replicated beyond the state resulting in a radical fragmentation of the concept. The cacophony is similarly symptomatic, it could be argued, of the question of inconceivability in that the application of the concept to a 'mysterious' 27 epistemic horizon such as that of global governance, gives rise to chaotic 'definitional conundrums' 28 surrounding the concept at the global level as evidenced by the cacophony. Furthermore, the cacophony seems to lend credence to the 'improbability' critique in that the slicing and dicing of the concept of constitutionalism evident in the global constitutional cacophony cannot hope to legitimate global governance in the ways in which its proponents seem to envisage such as to rival the pre -emptive authority of states. Finally, the attempt to sanctify that which ought not to be sanctified with the mantle of constitutionalism at the root of the illegitimacy critique results in in 'empty and misleading' 29 partial or fragmented conceptions of constitutionalism evident in the constitutional cacophony. Viewed in this light, the global constitutional cacophony seems to testify to the emptiness of the concept of constitutionalism beyond the state and the rudderlessness of the field of global constitutionalism. This article will attempt to address the global constitutional cacophony as well as suprastate constitutional skepticism by developing a particular conception of constitutionalism entitled 'constitutionalism as legitimacy'. In developing the conception of constitutionalism as legitimacy, the relationship between the historically contingent idea of constitutionalism and broader theories of legitimacy are traced in order to identify precisely the specific type or form of legitimacy that the notion of constitutionalism best resembles. Using the concept of legitimacy as a basis for a conception of constitutionalism, it is argued, provides a bridge between the state and non -state contexts in that it introduces a common denominator involving a mutual preoccupation with power and authority between these two contexts.
Constitutionalism as legitimacy presents the historical practices of constitutionalism in states as a discursive form of legitimacy which entails both factual and normative components. The concept of constitutionalism as legitimacy is further developed as a form of reason-giving for the legitimacy of an authority, identifying the relevant reasons with which constitutionalism purports to legitimate authority.
These relate to a mix of liberalism and republicanism and are ordered according to the primary preoccupations of both theories; the problematization of the origins, the aims and the methods of authority. The article goes on to illustrate how this framework of reasons in constitutionalism as legitimacy provides a 'good' account of the concept of constitutionalism in that it is historically relevant, sufficiently general to provide a workable conception in different institutional and political contexts as well as provides 30 Wiener et al (n 2) 8. 31 Ibid.
the important 'guidance function' of constitutionalism as a form of practical reason, 32 not least in the context of global governance.
The article proceeds as follows. Part 2 shows how a concern for legitimacy provides the key motivating factor behind global constitutional debates allowing it to serve as a common basis between state and nonstate conceptions of constitutionalism. Part 3 provides a brief overview of the idea of legitimacy and identifies constitutionalism as a 'mixed' form of legitimacy entailing both normative and descriptive components based on its status as a law-centric form of historical social practice. Part 4 develops the conception of constitutionalism as legitimacy as a framework of reasons for the legitimacy of authority based on the dimensions of power or authority problematized by the 'co-original' 33 theories of republicanism and liberalism; namely its origins, its aims and its methods. Part 5 shows how this conception of constitutionalism can be 'translated' to the global level without shedding its relevance or analytical or critical functions which is illustrated by reference to the legitimacy questions surrounding the United Nations Security Council's 'war on terror' and Part 6 shows how constitutionalism as legitimacy clearly addresses skepticism about the exportation of the concept of constitutionalism to the global context.
II. The Legitimacy of Global Constitutionalism
Any attempt to cut through the global constitutional cacophony to assess whether the cumulative skepticisms surrounding suprastate constitutionalism are warranted requires a substantive inquiry into the purposes of taking constitutionalism beyond the state, and its application to the global context in of the nature of international norms qua law and legal system properly so called. 40 This hoary old issue questions the credentials of the international legal order as a developed legal system (at least as compared with state legal systems) due to the lack of a centralized enforcement mechanism, the dubious 'systematicity' of norms providing the requisite unity of a global legal order, as well as the os tensibly poor record in obedience to the norms of international law by their primary addressees, states. 41 The putative fragmentation of international law feeds into and exacerbates this anxiety due to the fact that the fragmentation of the international legal order into a global 'disorder of normative orders' 42 seems to demonstrate the inability of international law qua unitary legal order to govern the globe in a comprehensive way, 43 thereby encouraging skepticism as to the existence of a robust overarchin g international legal system. For this form of international legal skepticism, then, international law is best conceived of as a 'set' 44 of rules rather than a system of law. However, concerns about the status of international law as a unitary legal system posed by the fragmentation of international law are not, or at least not only, concerns about international law for its own sake. Rather, the undermining of the idea of a unitary system of international law potentially threatens the increasingly central role attributed to law in the legitimacy of international relations. One of the hallmarks of the transition from the ' Westphalian' to the 'post-Westphalian' era is a shift away from legitimacy based on the balance of power, hegemony 45 Legitimacy is conventionally defined as the obedience of subjects to an authority bracketing coercion or self-interest. 57 That is that the reasons for the obedience of subjects to an authority relate to the legitimacy of that authority rather than the fact that it uses coercion to obtain obedience or that it serves the self-interest of each individual subject. extent to which the authority conforms to the values, standards and normative expectations of its subjects rather than merely reporting on the subjects' 'belief' in the legitimacy of an authority. 66 If sociological legitimacy focuses on the 'internal point of view' of the opinions and beliefs of the subjects of an authority, normative accounts of legitimacy relate to an 'external' or at least universalisable point of view, focusing on the form of objective or shared standards of (moral) conduct, creating or sustaining a 'right to rule' against which the an authority and its commands and actions can be evaluated. 67 It is under this rubric that vast swathes of normative political theory can be recast as theories of legitimacy. As Mulligan notes, even if many of the classical political theorists did not necessarily mention the word "legitimacy", the substance of their theories were essentially concerned with what we now call the normative or moral dimension of the legitimacy of authority. 68 The area of normative legitimacy/political theory is, of course, vast and diverse dealing with a variety of questions and values including the relationship between legitimacy and equality, liberty, consent, justice, security, democracy among as well as the complex issues of the relationship between the individual and a political community.
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A third 'mixed' account of legitimacy views legitimacy as a phenomenon which entails both sociological or 'factual' as well as political theoretical, or 'normative' dimensions. It has its origins in the Weberian account of legitimacy, 70 however perhaps the best known exponent of this particular form of legitimacy is the work of Jürgen Habermas, who has developed a complex account of legitimacy over the past number of decades. 71 Dismissing purely normative accounts of legitimacy as too abstract, and purely consensus around particular facts about how the world is; that is the forms of power and authority and the institutions and structures which support it, for example, in the particular political and constitutional arrangements of a state as well as the need to make decisions based on normative criteria. That is that the decisions or directives of authorities in certain factual circumstances must be justifiable to the subjects of that authority. A key element of legitimacy for Habermas is the idea of 'communicative power' 74 in which reasons have a 'motivational force' 75 for the subjects of an authority to obey its directives. Key to this process of legitimacy based on communicative power is a discourse principle where 'only those norms are valid to which all affected persons could agree as participants in rational di scourses'. 76 Summarizing and simplifying considerably what is a complex and sprawling theory, then, for Habermas legitimacy involves the process of communicative action surrounding the directives of an authority in a public discourse between authorities and subjects where reasons for the legitimacy of the authority based on citizens
interests, values and identities are mobilized creating a motivation for obedience on behalf of citizens themselves.
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Constitutionalism as Legitimacy
If constitutionalism is a proxy for legitimacy in global constitutional discourse (and indeed in much political theoretical discourse more generally), then the question of which type of legitimacy of the three broad categories outlined above constitutionalism best approximates is important to understand the ways in which constitutionalism can and cannot address the legitimacy of authroity. This in turn implicates some sort of definition of constitutionalism as the classification of constitutionalism as a p articular type of legitimacy, whether sociological, normative or mixed, will necessarily entail a stipulative understanding of 73 Which was the title of his book in English. Habermas 'BFN' (n 71). For an alternative, albeit Habermas -inspired, account of legitimacy as involving both factual and normative elements see C. Thornhill, 'Political Legitimacy: A Theoretical Approach Between Facts and Norms' (2011) 18(2) Constellations 135. 74 Habermas, 'BFN' (n 71), 151. 75 Habermas, 'BFN' (n 71), 151. 76 Habermas, 'BFN' (n 71), xxxvi 77 Habermas, 'BFN' (n 71) xxviii.
the concept of constitutionalism itself. Here the two questions will be dealt with in tandem. Firstly the criteria for any good account of constitutionalism will be elaborated before moving on to specify which type of legitimacy, under these constraints, best conforms to the concept of constitutionalism as it appears in constitutional and political debates.
In thinking about constitutionalism as a 'standard' 78 or 'touchstone' 79 of 'code' 80 of legitimacy, we are already constrained by its history and usage in the state context which narrows down somewhat the broad scope and contestation of the concept of legitimacy outlined briefly in the previous section. Firstly, constitutionalism is a way of thinking about legitimate government which is historically embedded in a particular era of human social and political development, primarily the development of the state from the sixteenth century onwards. 81 Whereas the concept of constitutionalism entails ideas and values which predate its incarnation, 82 the ideas which make up the contemporary conceptions of constitutionalism, including the idea of constitutionalism itself, are deeply rooted in modernity. In particular, the values, practices and rhetoric of the political upheavals and reforms in Europe and North America from the late seventeenth century to mid-way through the nineteenth mark the era when the basic elements of constitutionalism were firmly established. 83 These developments, of course, occurred and were particularly influenced by enlightenment thinking which inspired many constitutional reforms during this period.
84
Perhaps the single most important animating enlightenment ideal which shaped the development of constitutionalism as a 'political technology', and which makes it stand out as a truly modern idea, was the placing of individuals at the centre of the political universe. government. 93 The implication of law in the concept of constitutionalism introduces an element of 'facticity' to the concept of constitutionalism; that is something that is practiced and empirically verifiable, rather than a purely ideal concept. 94 Legal positivism has implicated the idea of 'real world' sociological practice to the idea of law, particularly in Hart's well-known 'social fact' account 95 , but even Kelsen, who was less sanguine about the contribution sociology could make to the concept of law, did insist on the idea of 'effectiveness' as an essential element of the concept of law. 96 Constitutionalism, therefore, like the concept of positive law itself, tracks the complex dynamic between the 'is' and the 'ought' in political and legal practices. Moreover, a further element of the implication of law in the concept of constitutionalism is the fact that it should track positive law's 'guiding' function. 97 That is that like law, constitutionalism should provide prescriptions for action in particular context. In this way, constitutionalism, like the concept of law, can be conceived of as a form of practical reasoning.
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In the light of these constraints when considering the concept of legitimacy from the viewpoint of constitutionalism, as a form of legitimacy, then, constitutionalism most corresponds, it is argued to the third category of legitimacy outlined in the previous section; that is that constitutionalism is a form of 'mixed' legitimacy which entails both factual and normative aspects. Whereas constitutionalism does have a sociological dimension stemming primarily from its law -centric nature, it also necessarily involves a strong normative dimension which provides a series of general reasons for the legitimacy of a particular authority based on, for example, its respect for certain substantive values such as fundamental rights.
Expressions of this 'mixed' form of legitimacy in constitutional thought are manifest in the work of a variety of contemporary constitutional scholars including Dworkin, 99 Alexy, 100 Raz, 101 Loughlin,
102
Fallon 103 and somewhat obviously Habermas, who in his later work has brought his ideas of legitimacy and communicative power to bear specifically on the questions of constitutional government.
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The factual dimension of constitutionalism as a form of legitimacy, then, implies that the appropriate context for the application of constitutionalism, the context within which constitutionalism is 'apt', is the existence, in fact, of a pattern of rule-based obedience to an authority, an empirically verifiable Republicanism departs from the premise that society is the most basic and primary political unit, within which individuals gain and develop their agency. 115 Republican theory is explicitly concerned with the terms of engagement, and frequent tensions between the individual and the collective, primarily mediated by the idea of self-legislation; where the individual and the collective interact through the involvement of the individual in collective decision-making. 116 Contemporary republican theory has developed this idea to promote a particular conception of freedom as non -domination whereby an individual is free to the extent that no other person or group 'has the capacity to interfere in their affairs on an arbitrary basis'. 117 In terms of legitimate government, then, in order to avoid arbitrary interference, public power must be traceable to citizens. To actively engage and participate in political decisions in the pursuit of the goals of self-legislation is to reduce the risk of being dominated by others, of having one's life chances interfered with by others on an arbitrary basis. Thus in institutional terms, the accent in republican theory is on deliberation, contestation and participation which makes it the natural foundation theory for political forms of constitutionalism.
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Unlike republicans, liberals postulate the individual as the most basic political unit and construct a political philosophy around this idea. The basic aim of politics, for liberals, is to secure the liberty of individuals by preventing unwarranted interference from political power. 119 Where it is necessary for political power to restrict individual liberty, such as to prevent harm to others, 120 this should only be done account of the development of the modern state, Oakeshott provides a similar picture of the development of politics in modernity, identifying the development of the modern state as a tension between two conc eptions of association drawn from Roman law; 'societas' and 'universitas' which tracks this dichotomy. The former relates to formal bonds of legality whereas the latter relates to an association bound together by a common purpose. 122 or through some sort of constructed agreement on basic values through an 'overlapping consensus'. 123 Given that these values are most basic or fundamental, then, they can and should be shielded from quotidian political processes though legal means such as their codification in a bill of rights or some other form of 'higher law' beyond the reach of daily politics. This position usually 124 leads liberals to favour judicial review to secure these values.
III. Developing 'Constitutionalism as Legitimacy'
As a 'mixed' form of legitimacy, then, constitutionalism relates to 'good arguments' 125 for the legitimacy of a particular authority as part of a broader discursive process. Weber emphasized the discursive reason-giving nature of legal-rational legitimacy arguing that giving of reasons created a motivation for obedience given the fact that a decision was based on reason rather than personal will. 126 This discursive aspect of legitimacy evident in Weberian accounts of legal-rationality was developed at length by Habermas in his idea of communicative action where, as noted, reasoning-giving plays a central role. 127 The exercise of coercion by the state is thus legitimated through the mobilization of 'reasons and arguments' 128 which generates the 'communicative power' 129 central to his account of legitimacy. This relationship between decisions of authority and their justification through reason-giving was also acknowledged by Carl Friedrich, the Germano-American constitutional theorist who made a connection between authority created by reason-giving -which supplements and act of will 'by adding reasons to it'
130
-and Theodor Mommesen's analysis of the etymology of the word 'authority'; which stems from the Roman root of the word augere, 'to augment'.
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However the reasons provided by an authority for its legitimacy are subject to reasonable disagreement and can therefore be challenged and contested. This is due to the fact that in a 'disenchanted' 132 world, where the idea of divine or metaphysical truths are no longe r accepted as authoritative reasons, 'secular' accounts of legitimacy will naturally attract reasonable disagreement. 133 As such, there is no privileged epistemic vantage point in contemporary politics which would allow for the shielding of particular legitimating reasons from disagreement and contestation. 134 Moreover, the 'co- The overlap is made more apparent in the way in which the same values can be concerned with different dimensions of public power. In the scheme above, for example, human rights can be seen as a liberally-infused limit in terms of the legitimacy of the methods of public power but it can, and does in practice, also feature in republican aims of public power, in that the protection of fundamental rights can be considered to be part of the common or public good. 148 Perhaps more strikingly, the protean value of democracy can be linked to all three dimensions; republican-inspired ideas such as constituent power can provide a powerful justificatory prop for subjecting decision-making to democratic institutions while some (particularly liberal) readings of legitimate aims see democratic procedure as the ultimate expression of the common good. 149 Democracy has also been posited as a necessary condition of a theory of a normatively desirable theory of law.
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Bringing the various values associated with constitutionalism together in this way to reveal the links as well as the tensions between them is of considerable normative value. The close relationship between republicanism and liberalism in the tradition as well as the discursive 'reasons' they offer for the legitimacy of political power means that when considering particular issues of constitutional value, such as the rule of law or fundamental rights in methods in order to think about the legitimacy of authority more broadly, we must keep the other, potentially competing, reasons offered by origins and aims in the frame.
Changes in one particular dimension can, and usually will, have an impact on the achievement of the others, and the extent and nature of this impact will, in turn, impact upon the legitimacy of the exercise of authority more generally. Thus, for example, arguments for the introduction of 'reasons' of method (such as rule of law values) to enhance the legitimacy of particular exercises of authority must contend with reasons relating to legitimate origins and aims such as democratic or policy-based arguments. This is particularly clear when the reason-giving by an authority is contested. The impact of the justification for a decision on the other potential justifications for authority means that they can be mobilized to contest the original justificatory basis of an exercise of authority.
In this way the framework shows how constitutional values are not 'freestanding' or 'time free' axiomatic goods applicable in the same way in all contexts. Rather, notwithstanding the universalistic 148 In this regard, Bellamy's republican account of political constitutionalism is concerned with the protection of fundamental rights. Bellamy (n 118). 149 Mill (n 120), Waldron (n 124). 150 See for example, J. Waldron, 'Can there be a Democratic Jurisprudence?' (2008) Emory L. J. 675.
tendencies of the constitutional values distilled from liberalism and republicanism, they operate in particular factual contexts where other, competing, liberal and/or republican-inspired constitutional values will be advanced as requiring equal or more respect which will be contested and debated in ongoing discourses regarding the legitimacy of a particular authority. Much of the way in which the discourse progresses will depend on the exogenous 'facts' of the constitutional context which will shape and structure the ensuing normative discourse.
IV. 'Constitutionalism as Legitimacy' Beyond the State
Walker identifies three requirements for the 'basis of translation' of the concept of constitutionalism between the state and suprastate levels; relevance, generality and normative salience. 151 The requirement of relevance demands that the translation is 'sensitive to a sufficiently 'thick' understanding of each local context' 152 ; the requirement of generality involves the idea that the translated concept must have some explanatory purchase in all contexts and the requirement of normative salience requires that constitutionalism retains its nature as a form of practical reasoning, providing 'solutions' to questions of legitimacy in the contexts to which it applied. 153 The conception of constitutionalism as legitimacy presented here, it is submitted, fulfills these three re quirements of translation allowing for it to provide insights into questions of legitimacy in global governance. Given that it shows the links between different and countervailing reasons for legitimacy, moreover, it does so in a way which brings order to, rather than replicates, the cacophony.
Firstly, the criteria of relevance, it is submitted, is implicated in the factual dimension of constitutionalism as legitimacy. As noted above, constitutionalism as legitimacy presupposes a sociologically factual practice of authority to which the legitimating discourse of reason-giving and contestation can be applied. As such, the relevant setting for constitutionalism in the context of global 151 Walker (n 32). 41-2. 152 Ibid. 153 Walker, (n 32) 42.
governance can be the structures established in a treaty regime, convergent submission to an authority by states or the decisions of suprastate intuitions. This means that the peculiar circumstances of particular local contexts of governance are already 'pre-loaded' into the conception of constitutionalism as legitimacy complying with the 'relevance' criteria for translation. Secondly, with regard to the 'generality' criteria, constitutionalism as legitimacy is sufficiently general to aid understanding of legitimacy questions in different sites of governance whether state, sub-state or suprastate. In the context of de facto authorities, therefore, it helps to explain why a de facto authority such as a global governance institution is successful in having its subjects (in the global governance context usually states) comply with its directives . Finally, constitutionalism as legitimacy also contains the resources for the critique of a de facto authority such as a global governance institution for failing to comply with particular normative benchmarks such as due process, lack of participation in decision-making or substandard review procedures. In this way constitutionalism as legitimacy contains the resources for prescriptions for reform of particular authorities undergoing, or at risk of, legitimacy crises. That constitutionalism as legitimacy successfully fulfills Walker's criteria for translation to the global level can be illustrated by applying the framework to an area which has attracted much interest from global constitutional scholars: the activities of the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) and in particular its 'war on terror'.
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Constitutionalism as Legitimacy and Global Governance: The Case of the United Nations Security Council
As noted, constitutionalism as legitimacy allows analytical insight as well as resources for critique of de facto authorities in a way which is sensitive to the relevant context whether state or suprastate. The 'activism' of the UNSC since the end of the cold war, and particularly its role in the 'war on terror'
has been well documented and has attracted considerable attention in global constitutional literature .
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This activism has primarily involved a shift in its activities as a primarily administrative and executive body to adopting more legislative measures in the aftermath of the terror attacks in the US on 11 September
2001
. 157 Its activities during this period have been the subject of considerable critique, based on the 'radical' 158 unauthorized expansion in its powers as well as the lack of procedural safeguards such as the presumption of innocence, the right to be heard, equality of arms, and rights to property and free movement. 159 Constitutionalism, particularly in its 'liberal-legal' 160 guise, has been primarily employed in this context in a prescriptive or 'shaping' form as a way of critiquing UNSC's activities in this area. 166 , an aim of public power which has been central to the legitimacy of states. 167 Reasons for the UNSC's legitimacy in its 'war on terror' are also present in the resolutions in their appeal to the legal authority of the UN Charter, and Chapter VII in particular, in executing its counter-terrorist programme. 168 This 'global state of emergency' as developed by the UNSC's war on terror is formally legal 169 making it very hard to 'make the ultra vires argument.' 170 As such, the framework also serves to highlight the legitimacy of the methods of the UNSC in respect of the formal legality of its actions through ideas of rule by law. 171 Against this backdrop of the uncontested aspects of the UNSC's activities, the framework also allows for the more common critiques of the activities of the UNSC to be put in context, that is critiques based on substantive legality and 'guarantisme' constitutionalism, 172 including the rule of law, due process, judicial review and human rights considerations. 173 Not only does this allow for a more nuanced understanding of questions of the (il)legitimacy of the UNSC in the context of its war on terror, but it also allows for a more effective method of critique, in identifying and clearly exposing the counter-positions to a critique based on substantive legality.
Given the discursive conception of legitimacy upon which the framework is based, t he question of the UNSC's legitimacy or otherwise will ultimately be thrashed out in the ongoing negotiation and renegotiation of the legitimacy of its particular political and legal practices and their evaluation by its primary constituencies, the constituent states of the UN, and also increasingly non-state actors such as of the UNSC's activities feed into this discursive (re)negotiation and how this plays out, and in particular which dimension of political power is prioritized, will ultimately depend on the dynamics and character of the relationship and the extent to which its legitimacy is contested. The success of one particular form of legitimacy such as substantive legality will be evidenced by a change in the practices of the UNSC and will ultimately depend on the extent to which the critical discourse of substantive legitimate methods gains sufficient traction. As is well known, the critique of substantive legality has borne fruit having been In cases such as this one, what the framework highlights is that in the combination of the stability and success of certain global governance institutions and critiques of their practices, that legitimacy is a more complex phenomenon than is often recognized in global constitutional discourses. This complexity means that the questions of the legitimacy of global governance, to which global constitutionalism is oriented, will not yield simple zero-sum answers. Rather, what constitutionalism as legitimacy emphasizes is that authority can be legitimate in some senses but not in others, according to some dimensions of public power but not others, more legitimate from a liberal perspective but not a republican one. As such, the framework of constitutionalism based on this tension provides a useful tool by which to approach the complexity of the question of legitimacy in global governance by appraising both the legitimacy as well as the illegitimacy of the various political relationships and sites of public power which make up th is phenomenon.
174 Moreover, the discourse will involve political and legal actors as the ECJ's involvement in the discourse through its Kadi decisions illustrates. Kadi (n 159 
V. Some Residual Skepticism?
The framework of reasons entailed in constitutionalism as legitimacy, as argued above, serves to put some order on the global constitutional cacophony by categorizing the different conceptions of constitutionalism which inform the debate and emphasizing the relationship between them, not least their 'equiprimordial' 177 nature and common root in a 'Western Constitutional Tradition.' However, if the cacophony can be ordered in this way, does this mean that the skepticism of which it was argued that the cacophony was symptomatic, can also be addressed? Does constitutionalism as legitimacy effectively deal with the quartet of suprastate constitutional skepticism? Can it take at least some of the sting of the alleged impossibility, inconceivability, improbability and illegitimacy of bringing constitutionalism beyond the state? It is submitted that it can.
Firstly, the impossibility and related inconceivability objections to suprastate constitutionalism entailed the idea that the state provides such a unique context with unique problems and a unique 'epistemic horizon' 178 to which the concept of constitutionalism was uniquely tailored, making its transportation beyond the state problematic. Whereas it is true that much suprastate governance is functionally limited to pursue particular policies such as trade, human rights or security , the lack of comprehensive 'sovereignty' in at least formal terms does not negative their status as authorities and their susceptibility to justification (and critique) along the lines of their origins, aims and methods. Neither their functionally limited competence, nor their suprastate context, makes these questions disappear. Indeed, much of the legitimacy crisis surrounding many global governance institutions testify precisely to the ongoing presence and relevance of these different grounds of legiti macy in global governance.
Constitutionalism as legitimacy addresses this twin skepticism through its emphasis on the questions to which constitutionalism is designed as the answer: the legitimacy of authority. This necessarily involves a measure of abstraction from particular expressions of constitutional practices in states to the problematization of authority more generally. Once abstracted in this way the differences between state and non-state contexts begin to recede, allowing us to see familiar questions between state and suprastate authorities to which constitutionalism can be put to use without foundering on the specificity of particular constitutional arrangements in particular state settings.
The improbability objection, that all law and politics is, in the final analysis reducible to the state system and its legitimating tendencies making the idea of suprastate constitutional authority 'improbable', is elided by constitutionalism as legitimacy and its focus on substantive questions of legitimacy. The improbability objection fails to take the 'post-Westphalian world' and the legitimacy problems affecting it seriously. That a global governance institution is not, nor can ever aspire to be, a state is neither analytically interesting nor relevant to the contemporary legitimacy problems which these types of authorities face. More problematically, to argue or assume that the problems with, for example, the UNSC's terrorist listing procedures is either not a 'real' problem given that states still exist, or that it is ultimately resolvable by states, seems anachronistic, or naïve or both.
Finally, and perhaps most prominently, constitutionalism as legitimacy meets the illegitimacy objection to suprastate constitutionalism head-on. As noted, the issue of the illegitimacy of suprastate constitutionalism involves the charge of sanctifying that which ought not to be sanctified. 179 That is, given constitutionalism's conventional use as a proxy for legitimacy, the emaciated or tendentious nature of much suprastate governance is not deserving of this symbolic legitimating label. 180 Some take this critique further, arguing that much suprastate and global governance has particular ideological leanings in a neoliberal direction which are shielded from contestation and are therefore not deserving of the legitimacy associated with constitutionalism. Rather than promoting an idea of constitutionalism as one tendentious panacea to problems of global legitimacy, it provides an organisation of reasons for the legitimacy of authority which can be used to gauge the legitimacy credits and deficits of individual sites of governance. In this way constitutionalism as legitimacy is quite balanced. 179 See Krisch (n 4). 180 Grimm (n 12). 181 Jayasuriya (n 20), Loughlin (n 12). 182 Walker (n 23) 524. 
VI. Conclusion
Constitutionalism 'We tend to fill voids with what we know. When we are thrown into unfamiliar spaces, we try to chart them with the maps we possess, construct them with the tools we already have. Working with analogies, extending and adapting existing concepts, seems usually preferable to the creation of ideas and structures from scratch, not only because of the risks involved in the latter, but also becaus e of our limits of imagination. When we try to imagine the post national space, it is not surprising then that we turn for guidance first to the well known, the space of the national'
Whereas Krisch opens with these reflections as the prelude to his critique of the idea of global constitutionalism, here they are presented as its vindication. The tendency to draw on the known to deal with the unknown is entirely natural and legitimate. Indeed, it is arguably an epistemological necessity; in the history of ideas, there is no view from nowhere. In taking legitimacy seriously in the context of global governance we are always building the ship at sea. As such we will, by necessity, fall back on the ways in which these forms of authority have conventionally been understood in its most prominent and most familiar form, that is within state practices. Therefore, rather than reinventing the wheel on legitimacy to the changed circumstances of global governance as some propose, the constitutionalism as legitimacy, given its reliance on a tradition 
